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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we investigate optimal load balancing strate-
gies for a multi-class multi-server processor-sharing system
with a Poisson input stream, heterogeneous service rates,
and a server-dependent holding cost per unit time. Specif-
ically, we study (i) the centralized setting in which a dis-
patcher routes incoming jobs based on their service time
requirements so as to minimize the weighted mean sojourn
time in the system; and (ii) the decentralized, distributed
non-cooperative setting in which each job, aware of its ser-
vice time, selects a server with the objective of minimizing
its weighted mean sojourn time in the system. For the de-
centralized setting we show the existence of a potential func-
tion, which allows us to transform the non-cooperative game
into a standard convex optimization problem.
For the two aforementioned settings, we characterize the set
of optimal routing policies and obtain a closed form expres-
sion for the load on each server under any such policy. Fur-
thermore, we show the existence of an optimal policy that
routes a job independently of its service time requirement.
We also show that the set of servers used in the decentralized
setting is a subset of set of servers used in the centralized
setting. Finally, we compare the performance perceived by
jobs in the two settings by studying the so-called Price of
Anarchy (PoA), that is, the ratio between the decentralized
and the optimal centralized solutions. When the holding
cost per unit time is the same for all servers, it is known
that the PoA is upper bounded by the number of servers
in the system. Interestingly, we show that the PoA for our
system can be unbounded. In particular this indicates that
in our system, the performance of selfish routing can be ex-
tremely inefficient.
Keywords
Load balancing, M/G/1 processor-sharing queues, server farms,
potential game, Price of Anarchy
1. INTRODUCTION
Communication services such as web server-farms, database
systems and grid computing clusters, routinely employ multi-
server systems to provide a range of services to their cus-
tomers. An important issue in such systems is to determine
the server to which an incoming request should be routed
to in order to optimize a given performance criterion. From
the service provider’s perspective, this choice of the strat-
egy (centralized or decentralized) and the service discipline
(Processor Sharing (PS), First-Come-First-Served (FCFS),
etc.) determines the amount of resources it needs to deploy
in order to guarantee a certain Quality-of-Service (QoS) to
its customers. Thus, an investigation of load balancing or
routing strategies in multi-server systems can give guidelines
to the service provider on dimensioning its system.
In this paper we study the optimal load balancing in a multi-
server processor-sharing system with heterogeneous service
capacities. This configuration is also known as processor-
sharing server-farms, and is a popular architecture in com-
puting centers, used for example in the Cisco Local Director,
IBM Network Dispatcher and Microsoft Sharepoint (see [5]
for a recent survey). This configuration can also be used to
model a web server farm, where requests for files (or HTTP
pages) arrive to a dispatcher are dispatched immediately to
one of the servers in the farm for processing. With each
server, we associate a service capacity (i.e., some servers
could be faster than the others) and a holding cost per unit
time. We assume that requests arrive as a Poisson process,
and that the service requirement of each request is sampled
from a finite set. For such a multi-server system, we in-
vestigate load balancing in two different settings: (i) the
centralized setting in which a dispatcher assigns the server
to an incoming request with the objective of minimizing the
weighted mean sojourn time of jobs in the system, and (ii)
the distributed non-cooperative setting in which an incom-
ing request selects a server in order to minimize its own
weighted mean sojourn time in the system. In both cases
we assume that the only information available to the deci-
sion maker (the dispatcher or the request itself) is the service
time requirement of the request. This might be the case, for
example, in situations where not all the servers are in the
same location and it may be costly to gather information on
the current queue lengths at the various servers.
The main contributions of the present work are as follows.
For both settings, we characterize the set of optimal rout-
ing policies, and give closed-form expressions for the load
on each server under any optimal policy. It is worthwhile
to note that for the distributed non-cooperative setting this
is done by showing the existence of a potential function,
which allows us to transform the non-cooperative game into
a standard convex optimization problem. We then give an
optimal policy in which an incoming request is routed to
a server with a probability that is independent of the ser-
vice requirement of the request. This property of the PS
discipline could be useful in systems in which the service re-
quirement of requests is not known a priori and it illustrates
an important difference between the optimal load balancing
policy in a PS server-farm and FCFS server-farm, since in
the case of a FCFS server-farm it has been shown that the
optimal load balancing does use information on the service
requirement of each request [9, 7]. Further, we show that
higher the ratio of the holding cost per unit time to the ser-
vice capacity of a server the lighter is the load on it, thus
defining an index to order the servers. For certain input pa-
rameters (i.e., an arrival process, service time distribution,
available service capacities, holding cost per unit time), it is
thus possible that some of the servers will not be processing
any requests. We show that the set of servers processing
requests in the decentralized setting is a subset of that in
the centralized setting. Thus, there is a trade-off in the per-
formance gains and cost of servers to be considered when
choosing between the two settings. We also note that, given
the input parameters, this analysis gives the set of servers
that a service provider should choose in order to minimize
the mean sojourn time in its system. Finally, we compare
the performance perceived by jobs in the two settings by
studying the so-called Price of Anarchy (PoA), that is, the
ratio between the selfish decentralized and the optimal cen-
tralized solutions. When the holding cost per unit of time
is the same in every server it is has been shown that the
PoA is upper bounded by the number of servers in the sys-
tem, see for example [21, 10]. Interestingly, we show that for
our system the PoA is unbounded, that is, it can be arbi-
trarily close to infinity. This indicates that unequal holding
costs may have a profound impact on the system’s perfor-
mance. In particular, the performance of selfish routing can
be unboundedly worse than the performance obtained by a
centralized routing.
1.1 Related work
Load balancing in multi-server systems has been previously
investigated not only in the context of communications ser-
vices but also in the broader context of queueing systems.
Global and Individual optimality in load balancing are con-
sidered in the monograph [12], which does not consider de-
cisions based on knowledge of the amount of load. Systems
with general service time distribution and FCFS scheduling
discipline were studied in [6, 2, 3, 7], while [16, 10] studied
systems with exponential service time distributions and ar-
bitrary scheduling discipline. In [8] the authors analysed a
multi-servers PS system where requests join the server that
has the smallest number of requests. Our work is closely
related to [21] and [10]. The main differences are that (i)
we consider a multi-class job arrival process, allowing the
dispatcher to use information on the size of the requests and
(ii) the addition of a heterogeneous holding cost per time
unit in each server. As we will see, both (i) and (ii) general-
izations allow us to draw important conclusions, that to the
best of our knowledge were not known before.
By considering a multi-class system, we wish to analyze how
the information on the service requirements of users impacts
the structure of the optimal load balancing. Our results
show that the structure of the optimal routing in a system
with the PS scheduling discipline is radically different with
respect to the FCFS case. For a multi-server FCFS system
with homogeneous service capacities it was conjectured in
[9], and proved in [7], that the optimal load balancing scheme
consists in assigning to each server all jobs whose process-
ing times fall within non-overlapping, continuous intervals
of processing times. The intuitive explanation to this result
comes from the fact that this strategy reduces the variabil-
ity of service times for each queue. Since the mean delay in
a FCFS queue is directly proportional to the variability of
the service time distribution (Pollaczek-Khinchin formula),
an interval-based policy can minimize the overall mean delay
in the system. Interestingly, if the service capacities are het-
erogeneous an interval-based strategy need not be optimal
[7]. In contrast, we show that in the case of a multi-server
PS system the optimal load balancing strategy does not take
advantage of the service time information, that is, the prob-
ability that a job joins a given server is independent of the
job’s service requirement.
1.2 Organization of the paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we describe the system model, state the assumptions, and
give the mathematical formulation for the problem under
consideration. In Section 3, we treat the centralized setting,
which is followed by the treatment of the decentralized set-
ting in Section 4. In Section 5, we compare the performance
of the two settings using various measures, such as the server
utilization and the Price of Anarchy.
2. MODEL FORMULATION
Consider a server farm consisting of a set of C servers. Let
S = {1, 2, ..., C} denote the index set of the set of servers.
Server j has a service rate rj , for all j ∈ S. At every server,
jobs are served according to the processor sharing (PS) disci-
pline. Customers arrive to the system according to a Poisson
process with rate λ. Depending on the application in mind,
a customer may correspond to a job with a certain amount
of service requirement, or of a file that has to be transmitted
and has a certain size. In the latter case we shall identify
the service requirement of the file as being its size.
Let {σk : 1 ≤ k ≤ K} denote the set of possible service
requirements (i.e. the job sizes) and assume that K is fi-
nite. Let K = {1, 2, ..., K} denote the index set of the set of
possible service requirement. Customers have independent
and identically distributed service requirements which are
sampled from {σk : k ∈ K} such that the probability that a
customer has service requirement σ−1i is given by βi, for all
i ∈ K.
As mentioned in the Introduction, we are interested in com-
paring the performance between the globally optimal solu-
tion and the distributed non-cooperative problem. We as-
sume that decisions are open-loop: they are taken without
knowledge of the queue sizes. However, we assume that the
service requirement of an arriving user is known, both to
the dispatcher in the centralized case and to the user itself
in the distributed non-cooperative setting. The decision on
which queue an arrival joins is assumed to depend only on
that information. Since the processes generated by splitting
a Poisson process are still Poisson, each server can be seen
as an M/G/1 − PS queue. We recall that the mean delay
in a PS queue depends on the service time distribution only
through its mean (the so-called insensitivity property of PS
[13]), therefore the mean number of jobs in an M/G/1−PS
queue is the same as in an M/M/1 queue.
All arrivals with a given size are called a class. We thus have
K classes of jobs where jobs of class i have mean size σ−1i .
We associate with class i an arrival rate λi = λβi, and a
traffic intensity ηi = λiσ
−1
i . Let
η =
X
i∈K
ηi
denote the total input traffic intensity.
Remark 1. Note that the value of K is arbitrary. There-
fore our formulation allows us to approximate a continuous
distribution arbitrarily closely, and thus we can investigate
the optimal size-based routing strategy.
Notation. We shall use a lower case bold-faced character
to denote a vector. The elements of a vector will be denoted
by the corresponding lower case characters. For example, a
denotes the 1×m vector (a1, a2, ..., am) where m is the size
of a. The vectors 0m and 1m will denote the 1×m vectors
with all elements as 0 and 1, respectively. We shall use the
symbol ¹ to denote elementwise inequality for vectors.
Strategies. A strategy for a class i of customers is defined
to be the probability vector (pi1, ..., piC), where pij is the
probability that a class i customer goes to queue j. Note
that for any strategy
PC
j=1 pij = 1. We define a multi-
strategy p = (pij), 1 ≤ i ≤ K, 1 ≤ j ≤ C as the matrix of
strategies of all classes.
For a multi-strategy p, let ρij(p) denote the load on server
j due to class i. The total load on server j is given by
ρj(p) =
X
i∈K
ρij(p) =
X
i∈K
ηipij
rj
. (1)
From queueing theory we know that server j is stable if
ρj(p) < 1. We shall say that p is a stable multi-strategy if all
servers are stable. The next proposition states the necessary
and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable multi-
strategy.
Proposition 1. There exists a stable multi-strategy if and
only if
X
j∈S
rj > η. (2)
Proof. For a multi-strategy p, from (1) we get
rjρj(p) =
X
i∈K
ηipij , for all j ∈ S.
Summing over all j and interchanging the two summations
on the right-hand side we get
X
j∈S
rjρj(p) =
X
i∈K
ηi
X
j∈S
pij = η. (3)
If
P
j∈S rj < η, then the load on some server must be larger
than 1 for (3) to hold. Thus, (2) is necessary for the existence
of a stable multi-strategy.
Now, assume (2) and consider the multi-strategy defined by
pij =
rjP
k∈S rk
, for all i ∈ K, and for all j ∈ S.
Due to the splitting property of Poisson processes, the ar-
rival process to each of the queues will also be Poisson under
this multi-strategy. Then, each server can be modeled as an
M/G/1 queue with
ρj(p) =
X
i∈K
ηipij
rj
=
P
i∈K ηiP
k∈S rk
< 1. (4)
and as a consequence every server j is stable. Thus, (2) is
sufficient for the existence of a stable multi-strategy.
Assumption 1. The traffic intensities and the service rates
are such that (2) is always satisfied.
Note that if p is a stable multi-strategy, then necessarilyPC
j=1 ρj(p) < C.
Since all the queues in our system are M/G/1−PS queues,
the mean number of jobs at any queue has the insensitivity
property: it depends on the service distribution only through
its expectation. For all j ∈ S, the mean number of jobs is
given by
E[Nj(p)] =
ρj(p)
1− ρj(p) , (5)
for ρj(p) < 1, and is infinity otherwise.
The total arrival rate to server j is
PK
i=1 λipij . Thus, by
Little’s law the mean sojourn time at queue j is given by
E[Tj(p)] =
E[Nj(p)]PK
i=1 λipij
. (6)
Even though sometimes we will not make the dependency
explicit, E[Nj ], ρj and E[Tj ], for all j ∈ S, shall be un-
derstood to depend on the multi-strategy relevant to the
context.
Our objective is to determine the multi-strategy p that min-
imizes the weighted mean number of jobs in the system, that
is,
argmin
p
CX
j=1
cjE[Nj ], (7)
where cj are some constants that depend on the index of
the of the queue and that can represent, for example, a cost
on the holding time. We recall that in all previous works,
the case cj = c, for all j ∈ S, was studied. By Little’s law,
minimizing the weighted mean number of jobs is equivalent
to minimizing the weighted mean sojourn time in the system.
Finally we note that throughout the paper we will assume
the servers are labeled such that
c1
r1
≤ c2
r2
≤ . . . ≤ cC
rC
. (8)
Remark 2. Since the objective function defined in (7) de-
pends only on the mean service time at each of the servers,
we could also interpret that the arrival stream is composed
of K classes, where jobs of different classes have different
service time distributions. The mean service time of class i
jobs is σ−1i , for i ∈ K. All the results in the present paper
would hold under this interpretation as well. Nevertheless,
for conciseness, in the present paper we stick to the inter-
pretation expressed in Remark 1.
3. THE GLOBAL OPTIMIZATION PROB-
LEM
In this section we consider the global optimization problem,
in which a dispatcher decides where each job will get service
so as to minimize the weighted mean number of jobs in the
system. The global optimization problem can be formulated
in terms of the following Mathematical Program (MP):
minimize
X
j∈S
cjE[Nj(p)] (9)
subject to
X
j∈S
pij = 1, for all i ∈ K; (10)
p º 0; (11)X
i∈K
ηipij < rj , for all j ∈ S. (12)
We note that if condition (2) is satisfied, then there exists
a multi-strategy which satisfies these constraints and vice
versa.
Since the objective function is convex and the constraints
are linear, MP is a standard convex programme, and its
solution can be found in polynomial time in the number of
unknowns and in the number of constraints. We note that
there may exist multiple multi-strategies that minimize (9)
subject to (10)-(12).
3.1 Size-unaware multi-strategies
The following result will play a key role in the rest of the pa-
per. It shows that there exists a size-unaware multi-strategy
that is optimal.
Proposition 2. Let p be a multi-strategy satisfying the
constraints (10)-(12). The multi-strategy p̂ defined by
p̂ij =
P
l∈K ηlplj
η
=
ρj(p)rj
η
, (13)
for all i ∈ K and for all j ∈ S, also satisfies the constraints
(10)-(12). Moreover, the load on a server under p̂ is equal
to the load on it under p.
Proof. The equality
X
j∈S
p̂ij =
X
j∈S
P
l∈K ηlplj
η
= 1,
for all i ∈ K, shows that p̂ satisfies (10).
Since ηi is non-negative for all i ∈ K, and p satisfies (11), p̂
also satisfies (11).
The equality
X
i∈K
ηip̂ij =
X
i∈K
ηi
P
l∈K ηlplj
η
=
X
l∈K
ηlplj
helps us to verify that p̂ indeed satisfies (12).
Finally, since
ρj(p̂) =
P
i∈K ηip̂ij
rj
=
P
l∈K ηlplj
rj
= ρj(p),
for all j ∈ S, the load on a server is the same under both p
and p̂.
From Proposition 2, we can infer that, for every feasible
multi-strategy, there exists a feasible size-unaware multi-
strategy such that both these strategies induce the same
load on the servers. Since the objective function in the MP
depends on the multi-strategy only through the induced load
(cf. (5)), we can conclude that one may restrict oneself with-
out loss of optimality to finding policies that take routing
decisions independently of the (known) amount of service
requirement of a job. The result of Proposition 2 further il-
lustrates that the optimal load balancing in PS server farms
is rather different than in FCFS server farms, where the size
of jobs is used by the optimal routing policy.
Moreover, the value of the mathematical programming (9)-
(12) can be obtained by optimizing directly over the loads.
The routing probabilities can be determined later from (13),
once the load on each server is determined.
Let
fj(x) =

cjx/(1− x), for 0 ≤ x < 1;
∞, otherwise.
From (5) and Proposition 2, we can conclude that an optimal
load balancing policy is obtained by applying (13) to the
solution of the following Reduced Mathematical Program
(RMP):
minimize
X
j∈S
fj(ρj) (14)
subject to 0 ¹ ρ ≺ 1; (15)X
j∈S
rjρj = η. (16)
Constraint (16) guarantees that all incoming jobs are served.
3.2 Characterizing the solution
Depending on the values of the service rates and the holding
costs per unit time, the optimal multi-strategy may not use
all servers, but due to constraint (16) we are certain that at
least one server will be used. Let SG ⊆ S denote the subset
of servers that the optimal multi-strategy uses.
In the following theorem we characterize the solution of (14)-
(16). In particular we note that the solution to (14)-(16) is
unique.
Theorem 1. The subset of servers that are used in the
optimal load balancing is SG = {1, . . . , j∗}, where
j∗ = sup
(
j ≤ C :
jX
k=1
√
cjrj >
 
jX
k=1
rk − η
!r
cj
rj
)
(17)
Under the optimal multi-strategy, the load on server j ∈ SG
is
ρ∗j = 1−
r
cj
rj
P
k∈SG rk − ηP
k∈SG
√
ckrk
. (18)
Proof. The Lagrangian associated with the RMP can be
defined as
L(ρ, ν, ζ, γG) =
X
j∈S
fj(ρj) +
X
j∈S
νj(0− ρj) +
X
j∈S
ζj(ρj − 1)
+ γG
 X
j∈S
rjρj − η
!
, (19)
where ν º 0, ζ º 0 and γG ∈ R.
Note that the RMP is convex. From Proposition 1 (see (4))
there exists a feasible solution. As a consequence by Slater’s
condition [4, Section 5.2.3] strong duality is satisfied. Then,
ρ∗ and (γG∗, ν∗, ζ∗) are primal and dual optimal with zero
duality gap if they satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions
0 ¹ ρ∗ ≺ 1;
X
j∈S
rjρ
∗
j = η;
γG∗ ∈ R; ν∗ º 0; ζ∗ º 0;
ν∗j ρ
∗
j = 0, ζ
∗
j (ρ
∗
j − 1) = 0, for all j ∈ S; (20)
cj
1
(1− ρ∗j )2
− γG∗rj − ν∗j + ζ∗j = 0, for all j ∈ S. (21)
Condition (20) are the so-called complementary slackness,
which hold due to strong duality.
Since the objective function tends to infinity when ρj tends
to 1 at any server j, it follows that necessarily ρ∗ ≺ 1.
Therefore, from (20) it follows that ζ∗ = 0. Since ν º 0,
from (21) we get
γG∗ ≤ cj
rj
1
(1− ρ∗j )2
, for all j ∈ S, (22)
and on eliminating the variables νj from (20), we get
„
cj
1
(1− ρ∗j )2
− γG∗rj
«
ρ∗j = 0, for all j ∈ S. (23)
For a given server j, if γG∗ is greater than cj/rj , then (22)
can only be satisfied if ρ∗j is greater than 0 as well, which
together with (23) implies that
ρj = 1−
r
cj
rj
r
1
γG∗
. (24)
Assume now that γG∗ ≤ cj/rj . If ρj is greater than 0 then
γG∗ ≤ cj/rj < cj
(1− ρ∗j )2rj
,
which violates the complementary slackness condition (23).
Thus, if γG∗ ≤ cj/rj , then ρ∗j is equal to 0. In conclusion,
we have
ρ∗j =
(
1−
q
cj
rj
q
1
γG∗ , if γ
G∗ > cj/rj ;
0, otherwise.
(25)
From the above equation, we see that ρ∗j are non-decreasing
in γG∗. Therefore, there is a unique value of γG∗ such that
constraint (16) is satisfied. Since cj/rj is non-decreasing in
j, it now follows that SG = {1, . . . , j∗}, where j∗ can be
computed using (22) and is such that
cj∗
rj∗
< γG∗ <
cj∗+1
rj∗+1
. (26)
From (24) and (16), we obtain
r
1
γG∗
=
P
k∈SG rk − ηP
k∈SG
√
ckrk
, (27)
which together with (26) gives
j∗ = sup
(
j ≤ C : cj
rj
<
 Pj
k=1
√
ckrkPj
k=1 rk − η
!2)
,
which is an equivalent condition to the one stated in (17)
On combining (26) and (25), we get
ρ∗j = 1−
r
cj
rj
P
k∈SG rk − ηP
k∈SG
√
ckrk
,
which is the result stated in (18).
Corollary 1. The size-unaware multi-strategy, p̂∗, is
given by
p̂∗ij =
ρ∗j rj
η
, for all i ∈ K and for all j ∈ S. (28)
Remark 3. The solution structure of Theorem 1 is known
as water-filling. We will say more about this in Section 4.4.
From Theorem 1 we see that ρ∗j > ρ
∗
i , for any j < i.
Since the mean number of jobs in a server increases with its
load, we conclude that, under any optimal multi-strategy,
E[Nj ] > E[Ni] for any j < i. Interestingly, in the next
proposition we show that, even though ρ∗j > ρ
∗
i , the weighted
mean sojourn time in server j will be smaller than the weighted
mean sojourn time in server i.
Proposition 3. For the multi-strategy (28), and for any
two servers j and i in SG,
cjE[Tj ] < ciE[Ti], for j < i.
Proof. From Little’s law (see equation (6)) and the multi-
strategy (2) we have
cjE[Tj ] =
cjE[Nj ]P
i∈K λip̂
∗
ij
=
cjE[Nj ]P
i∈K λi
ρjrj
η
.
Substituting (18) we get
cjE[Tj ] =
r
cj
rj
η
P
k∈SG
√
ckrk
P
k∈K λi
“P
k∈SG rk − η
” .
The proof now concludes by noting that for any j < i,
cj/rj < ci/ri.
3.3 Alternative characterization of the optimal
solution
In this subsection we write in vector form the KKT con-
ditions that characterize the optimal solution to the global
optimization problem. This representation will play a cru-
cial role in determining the optimal routing strategy in the
distributed non-cooperative setting. For simplicity in the
exposition, we assume that all servers are used.
Let us first introduce the Hadamard product for matrices.
For two arbitrary matrices X = (x)ij and Y = (y)ij of the
same dimension, we denote by X•Y the matrix whose (i, j)
element is aijbij . Thus, the Hadamard product just refers to
the element-wise product of matrices. The standard product
of two matrices is denoted by X ·B. Finally for an arbitrary
matrix X we denote by XT its transpose matrix.
Let t(p) be the gradient of the objective function, i.e., t(p)
is a matrix of dimension K×C whose (i, j) element is given
by
tij =
∂
P
k∈S fk(p)
∂pij
. (29)
Then, similar to the derivation of (22)-(23), p is optimal
for the original problem (9)-(12) if and only if there exist
Lagrange multipliers γ1, ..., γC and a matrix Γ of dimensions
K × C whose (i, j) element is given by
Γij = γj ,
such that
(t + Γ) • p = 0, (30)
t + Γ º 0, (31)
1C · pT = 1K , p º 0. (32)
Note that equations (30) and (31) are the analogue of equa-
tions (23) and (22), respectively.
This equivalent characterization through complementarity
inequalities of a globally optimal solution will be essential
for the next section.
4. THE INDIVIDUAL OPTIMALITY
We study now the distributed non-cooperative setting, where
an arriving customer, say of class i, aware of its required
amount of service (σi)
−1, wishes to minimize its own weighted
expected sojourn time. The weighting is done according to
the queue to which the file is sent as can be viewed as a
pricing that may vary from one queue to another. If a class-
i user chooses to be served by server j then its weighted
conditional expected sojourn time there is
τij(p) = cjE[Tj(p)|i] = cj
rjσi
× 1
1− ρj(p) . (33)
Definition 1. We say that customers of class i use queue
j if ρij > 0; i.e., queue j receives a strictly positive load from
class i.
Definition 2. We say that a strategy p is an equilib-
rium for the individual optimization problem if for each
i = 1, ..., K, each j = 1, ..., C and each queue k used by
class i,
E[ckTk(p)|i] = min
j=1,...,K
E[cjTj(p)|i]. (34)
Without loss of generality, we can replace the equilibrium
condition in (34) with the condition
E[dickTk(p)|i] = min
j=1,...,K
diE[cjTj(p)|i]. (35)
where di are arbitrary strictly positive constants.
Equation (34) characterizes the equilibrium, since only when (34)
is satisfied users will not have an incentive to deviate from
their strategy.
4.1 A potential game approach to obtain the
equilibrium
Denote by T(p) a K × C matrix whose (i, j) element is
τij(p). Let a be the matrix of dimensions K × C whose
(i, j) element is given by aij = aj .
We can characterize the equilibrium by the following rela-
tions: p is an equilibrium if and only if there is some a such
that the following holds.
`
T(p) + a
´ • p = 0, (36)
T(p) + a º 0, (37)
1C · pT = 1K , p º 0. (38)
We observe (36)-(38) and note that they are the same as the
system (30)-(32), provided that we identify the minimum
cost vector a with the Lagrange multiplier vector Γ, and we
identify T as a gradient vector of some potential function
G.
Since system (30)-(32) were equivalent to a global minimiza-
tion, we conclude that (36)-(38) are equivalent to the equilib-
rium p being the global minimum of the function G subject
to the constraints (38). Note that the minimum is unique
in terms of ρj if G is a strictly convex function of ρj .
Games that can be transformed into an equivalent optimiza-
tion problem with a common function optimized jointly by
all users are known as potential games. They have been in-
troduced in [1] in the context of road traffic, see also [17, 15,
18, 20]. In particular, the existence of a potential function
is a sufficient condition for various greedy dynamics of the
game to converge to equilibrium.
Proposition 4. The distributed non-cooperative game can
be transformed into a standard convex optimization problem
of minimizing
CX
k=1
ck log T (ρk(p)) (39)
subject to the constraints (10)-(12) where T (z) := 1/(1− z)
for 0 ≤ z < 1 and ∞ for z ≥ 1.
Proof. Define
G(p) :=
CX
k=1
Z ρk(p)
z=0
ckT (z)dz. (40)
Then
G(p) =
CX
k=1
Z ρk(p)
z=0
ckT (z)dz =
CX
k=1
ck log T (ρk(p))
Thus,
∂G(p)
∂pij
= cjT j(p)× dρj
dpij
=
cj
1− ρj(p) ×
λi
σirj
= λi
“
cjE[Tj(p)|i]
”
We conclude that G is indeed a potential as its gradient
coincides with the original costs as given in (35), where di =
λi.
The optimal solution p to (39) is given by the only vector
that satisfies the KKT conditions, which in turn are precisely
given by (36)-(38), where a denotes the Lagrange multiplier
vector.
This implies that indeed the game can be transformed into a
standard convex optimization problem of minimizing G sub-
ject to the constraints (10)-(12), whose solutions are equi-
libria in the original game.
As we did in Section 3.1, we can further simplify the above
optimization problem. Indeed, the value is directly obtained
through minimizing G(p) :=
PC
k=1
R ρk
z=0
ckT (z)dz subject to
(15)-(16). The solution to the game problem is obtained
from the loads that achieve the minimization by using (13).
4.2 Fairness
Let us interpret the meaning of the potential function G.
Define ∆k := 1− ρk to be the excess capacity at server k.
We note that the argument that achieves the minimization
of G(p) achieves the maximum of the product of (∆1)
c1 ×
(∆2)
c2 × · · · × (∆C)cC . We conclude the following:
Theorem 2. The individual optimal load balancing so-
lution coincides with the routing strategy that achieves the
weighted proportional fair excess capacities between the C
servers, where the weight for server k is given by the powers
ck.
Proof. The result is a direct consequence of (39) and the
definition of Proportional Fair allocation.
4.3 Characterizing the Individual Optimal so-
lution
Since we have shown that the individual setting corresponds
to a potential game, in equilibrium, the optimal routing
strategy will minimize (40) subject to (15)-(16). We have
the following result.
Theorem 3. The subset of servers that are used in the
optimal routing strategy in the non-cooperative setting is of
type SI = {1, . . . , j∗}, where
j∗ = sup
(
j ≤ C :
jX
k=1
cj >
 
jX
k=1
rk − η
!
cj
rj
)
(41)
For every j ∈ SI , the load is
ρj = 1− cj
rj
Pj
k=1 rk − ηPj
k=1 ck
. (42)
Proof. The derivation follows the same steps of the proof
of Theorem 1. From Proposition 1 (see equation (4)) there
exists a feasible solution. As a consequence, by Slater’s con-
dition [4, Section 5.2.3] strong duality holds. Then from the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions if
0 ≤ ρj ≤ 1, j = 1, . . . , C,
X
j∈SI
rjρj = η,
γI ∈ R, νj ≥ 0, ζj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , C,
νjρj = 0, ζj(ρj − 1) = 0, j = 1, . . . , C, (43)
cj
(1− ρj) − γ
Irj − νj + ζj = 0, (44)
then ρj , j = 1, . . . , C and (γ
I , ν, ζ) are primal and dual
optimal with zero duality gap.
Since the objective function tends to infinity if ρj → 1 at
some server, it follows that necessarily ρj < 1, j = 1, . . . , C.
Because of (43) this implies that ζj = 0, for all j. Now note
that νj are slack variables which can be eliminated. Since
νj ≥ 0, from (44) we get
γI ≤ cj
rj
1
(1− ρj) , (45)
and from (43) we have
„
cj
(1− ρj) − γ
Irj
«
ρj = 0. (46)
Now, if γI > cj/rj , equation (45) can only be satisfied if
ρj > 0, and from (46) this implies that
ρj = 1− cj
rj
1
γI
. (47)
Assume now that γI ≤ cj/rj . If ρj > 0 then this implies that
γI ≤ cj/rj < cj(1−ρj)rj , which violates the complementary
slackness condition (46). Thus if γI ≤ cj/rj then ρj = 0. In
conclusion we have that
ρj =
(
1− cj
rj
1
γI
γI > cj/rj
0 γI < cj/rj .
It follows that ρj > 0 are non-decreasing in γ
I . Thus there
is a unique value of γI such that constraint (16) is satisfied.
It follows that SI = {1, . . . , j∗}. From (45) we have that the
index j∗ is such that
cj∗
rj∗
< γI <
cj∗+1
rj∗+1
. (48)
Substituting (47) in (16) we get
1
γI
=
P
k∈SI rk −
PK
i=1 ηiP
k∈SI ck
. (49)
This proves equation (42).
From (48) we get that server j is used if and only if
cj
rj
<
Pj
k=1 ckPj
k=1 rk −
PK
i=1 ηi
,
from where (41) follows.
We note that a routing strategy that achieves the desired
load (42) in every server (and as a consequence the same
performance) can be obtained by (13).
Remark 4. From (42) it is easy to see that (34) is satis-
fied for each i = 1, . . . , K and each j ∈ SI . This can also be
seen from equation (47), which implies that in every server
j ∈ SI that is used the mean cost per unit of service required
at the server,
cj/rj
1−ρj = γ
I , is independent of the server.
From Remark 4 and Proposition 3 we observe the main dif-
ference between the global and individual optimal solutions.
In the individual optimal solution is constrained to a solu-
tion such that the mean sojourn time is the same in each
server. In the global optimal solution the weighted mean so-
journ time varies across the servers, and in fact, it increases
as the index of the server increases (see Proposition 3).
When ci = c, ∀i, equation (41) becomes
rj+1 < (
jX
k=1
rk −
KX
k=1
ηi)
1
j
. (50)
Equation (50) has a clear interpretation. Server j+1 will not
be used if the exceeding capacity per server when j servers
are used is larger than rj+1.
4.4 The structure of the selfish routing
We recall from (8) that servers are relabeled in increasing
order with respect to the ratio cj/rj , j = 1, . . . , C. Let there
be M1 servers with ci/ri = c1/r1. Let there be M2 servers
with ci/ri = cM1+1/rM1+1. Let there be Mk servers with
ci/ri = cMk−1+1/rMk−1+1.
Then, from (34), the optimal policy has the following water-
filling structure. For λ sufficiently small, only the first M1
servers receive positive flow. This flow is assigned in a
way that equalizes the expected delay among the first M1
servers. We increase λ till a point where
c1
r1
× 1
1− ρ1(p) =
c2
r2
.
From this point, we route flow to all M1 + M2 first servers
in a way that equalizes the expected delays on these servers.
No flow is sent to other servers.
This type of solution is often referred as to water-filling.
5. COMPARING THE GLOBAL AND INDI-
VIDUAL OPTIMUM SOLUTIONS
In this section we compare the optimal load balancing ex-
pressed in Theorems 1 and 3. Our first result shows SI ⊆
SG, that is, the number of servers that are used in the global
optimum solution is greater or equal to the number of servers
used in the distributed non-cooperative setting. This indi-
cates that in the non-cooperative setting, users will tend
to overload fast servers, and fail to recognize the benefits
that using a slower server can have. A similar property was
proven in [2] for a exponential multi-server system.
In this section, ρGj and ρ
I
j will denote the load in server j in
the global and individual optimal solution, respectively. In
view of (24) and (47) we will consider that both ρGj := ρ
G
j (γ)
and ρIj := ρ
I
j (γ) are a function of a common variable γ.
We start with the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. For 0 < γ ≤ cj/rj, ρGj (γ) = ρIj (γ) = 0. For
γ > cj/rj, ρ
G
j (γ) < ρ
I
j (γ).
Proof. The case γ ≤ cj/rj is obvious. For the second
case, we have
γ > cj/rj
√
γ√
γ
√
γ >
r
cj
rj
=
cj
rjq
cj
rj
r
cj
rj
r
1
γ
>
cj
rj
1
γ
and from equations (24) and (47) it follows that ρGj (γ) <
ρIj (γ).
Proposition 5. For any arrival rate and service time
distribution it holds SI ⊆ SG
Proof. From Theorems 1 and 3 (equations (27) and (49))
it is sufficient to prove that γG > γI . We prove the state-
ment by contradiction. Assume that γG ≤ γI . If γI < cj/rj ,
then ρIj (γ) = ρ
G
j (γ) = 0. If γ
I > cj/rj then ρ
I
j (γ
I) > 0 and
from Lemma 1 we have
ρIj = ρ
I
j (γ
I)
γI≥γG
≥ ρIj (γG)
Lemma 1
> ρGj (γ
G) = ρGj .
It follows then that
CX
j=1
rj(ρ
I
j − ρGj ) > 0,
but this is a contradiction with (3), and as a consequence
γG > γI .
In the following theorem we show that the individual optimal
overloads the servers with smallest cj/rj .
Theorem 4. There exists an index i∗ such that

ρGj < ρ
I
j j < i
∗
ρGj > ρ
I
j j ≥ i∗.
Proof. Due to constrain (3), there exists an index i∗
such that ρGi∗ > ρ
I
i∗ . Now it suffices to show that ρ
G
j > ρ
I
j ,
for all j > i∗. From (24) and (47) we have that
ρGi∗ > ρ
I
i∗r
ci∗
ri∗
r
1
γG
<
ci∗
ri∗
1
γI
γI <
r
ci∗
ri∗
p
γG.
Since j > i∗, it follows that cj/rj > ci∗/ri∗ . Thus
γI <
r
ci∗
ri∗
p
γG
<
r
cj
rj
p
γG
=
cj
rjq
cj
rj
p
γG,
and rearranging we get
r
cj
rj
r
1
γG
<
cj
rj
1
γI
.
From (24) and (47) it follows that ρGj > ρ
I
j .
5.1 Price of Anarchy
We now study the so-called Price of Anarchy.
Definition. The price of anarchy (PoA) is defined as the
ratio between the performance (mean delay) obtained by
the Wardrop equilibrium and the global optimal solution
[14] (see also [19]).
By Little’s law, calculating the ratio between the mean de-
lays is equivalent to calculating the ratio of the mean number
of users. Then from the objective function (7) and the solu-
tion of Theorems 1 and (3) we get (note that x
1−x =
1
1−x−1):
PoA =
P
k∈SI ck
P
k∈SI rkP
k∈SI rk−η
−Pk∈SI ck
“P
k∈SG
√
ckrk
”2
P
k∈SG rk−η
−Pk∈SG ck
. (51)
The Price of Anarchy has been studied as a measure of the
inefficiency of selfish-routing (or non-cooperative decentral-
ized) in networks. This measure has received lot of attention
in recent years. For example, in an important general result,
it has been shown that when the cost function in every arc
is linear, then for any arbitrary multi-commodity network
the PoA is upper bounded by 4/3 [19]. In [10] and [21]
the authors study a multi-server system with the objective
of minimizing (7) with equal costs, that is, cj = c, ∀j, and
show that PoA ≤ C, with C denoting the number of servers.
Note that the upper bound holds for any parameter configu-
ration. In addition, in [10, Example 3.1] it is shown that the
upper bound is tight, i.e., there exists a network configura-
tion such that the PoA is arbitrarily close to C. This result
indicates that the inefficiency of selfish routing is limited.
In Theorem 5 we show that this changes dramatically when
holding costs per unit of time associated to each server are
considered in the objective function. In this case the PoA
is unbounded, that is, for every θ < ∞, there exist a set of
values such that PoA > θ. Our main result on the Price of
Anarchy is the following.
Theorem 5. For every θ, there exist cj and rj, j ∈ S,
such that PoA > θ.
Proof. In order to prove this result we construct an ex-
ample in which PoA can be unbounded. Let r1 > η, and let
cj = rj = 1 for 2 ≤ j ≤ C. Let
(r1 − η)
r1
< c1 < r1 − η. (52)
For this particular choice of costs and server speeds, cj/rj
is non-decreasing in j.
We first show that in the globally optimal multi-strategy all
the servers are used, whereas in the solution of the individual
optimization problem only the first server is used.
Global optimization: Note that cj/rj = 1, ∀j ≥ 2. In view
of (17), server j, j ≥ 2, will be used if
jX
k=1
√
cjrj =
√
c1r1 + j − 1
> r1 − η + j − 1
=
 
jX
k=1
rj − η
!r
cj
rj
,
where the inequality follows from the assumption c1 >
(r1−η)2
r1
.
Since this is true for every j ≤ C, the load on every server
is positive.
Individual optimization: For j = 2, the left-hand side of (41)
c1 + c2 = c1 + r2
< r1 − η + r2
= (r1 + r2 − η)
r
c2
r2
,
where the inequality follows from the assumption c1 < r1−η.
Thus, in the non-cooperative setting all the jobs choose to
go to the first server.
From (51), the Price of Anarchy
PoA =
„
c1r1
r1 − η − c1
«
× 1
(
P
k∈SG
√
ckrk)
2
P
k∈SG rk−η
−Pk∈SG ck
=
c1η
r1 − η×
r1 − η + (C − 1)
(
√
c1r1 + (C − 1))2 − (c1 + (C − 1))(r1 − η + (C − 1))
(53)
Since (r1−η)
2
r1
< c1 < r1 − η, let
c1 =
1
2
„
(r1 − η)2
r1
+ r1 − η
«
= (r1 − η)2r1 − η
2r1
. (54)
Now as r1 ↓ η, the numerator of (53) tends to η2(C − 1),
whereas the denominator tends to 0.
Therefore, by choosing r1 close enough to η, the Price of
Anarchy for this system can be made to exceed any given
real number.
Remark 5. We note that examples where the PoA is un-
bounded have been previously found. For instance, it is easy
to determine an instance of the popular Prisoner’s dilemma
where the PoA is unbounded. It also follows from the net-
work studied in [11] that the PoA is unbounded.
5.1.1 Discussion on Theorem 5
In order to provide an intuitive idea behind Theorem 5, first
note that a key underlying idea is that in the global opti-
mal all servers are used, whereas in the non-cooperative set-
ting only one server is used. This property follows directly
from the the upper and lower bounds of (52). Let us con-
sider the lower bound in (52). From equations (26) and (27)
and the water-filling structure of the solution, we see that
if r1c1
(r1−η)2 <
c2
r2
= 1, only server 1 will be used. Server 2
(and similarly all other servers), will start being used exactly
when c1 > (r1 − η)2/r1, which explains the lower bound on
c1 in (52). Similarly, from (48) and (49) we can see that the
upper bound in (52) guarantees that only server 1 is used in
the non-cooperative setting.
As we have seen, the Price of Anarchy is given by PoA =
minp
PC
j=1 cjE[N
I
j ]
minp
PC
j=1 cjE[N
G
j ]
. Let us look to the numerator and denom-
inator separately.
In the non-cooperative solution only server 1 is used. ThusPC
j=1 cjE[N
I
j ] = c1E[N
I
1 ], and server 1 is a standard M/G/1
queue. Thus, as r1 ↓ η, E[NI1 ] tends to infinity, but this is
compensated by the fact that c1 → 0, and overall c1E[NI1 ] →
η/2. Another way to see this is from equation (33), where
we see that τi1 =
c1
r1−η . Thus, with c1 given from (54), it
turns out that as r1 ↓ η, the performance (weighted with
the cost) that users joining server 1 remains unchanged.
In the global optimal solution, always all servers are used.
As r1 ↓ η, the global optimal also tends to route everything
towards server 1, but the key property is that since all servers
are used, the global optimal can do this in such a way that
E[NG1 ] grows more slowly than the decrease of c1, and as a
consequence c1E[N
G
1 ] → 0.
More specifically, this is what happens with the global op-
timal solution. First, for all j ≥ 2, as r1 ↓ η (and c1 given
by (54)), ρj → 0. Since cj , ∀j ≥ 2, remain constant this
implies that
PC
j=2 cjE[N
G
j ] → 0. Concerning server 1, from
(24), as r1 ↓ η, ρ1 = 1 − o(√r1 − η), which implies that
E[NG1 ] = O(1/
√
r1 − η). Since c1 = o(r1 − η) as r1 ↓ η, it
turns out that c1E[N
G
1 ] → 0. Thus, for the global optimal
solution
PC
j=1 cjE[N
G
j ] → 0 as r1 ↓ η, which explains why
the PoA can not be bounded.
This result states that the PoA is unbounded for the load
balancing problem under consideration. It is in complete
contrast to finite upper bounds obtained by [10, 21], for
similar models but without holding costs per unit of time
associated to each server. Thus, when holding costs are
taken into account, a significantly different PoA is obtained.
5.2 The case when rj and cj/rj are not equal
Theorem 5 can be extended to the case when not all rj are
equal and cj/rj are not necessarily equal.
Let r =
P
j∈S rj be the aggregate available service rate of
system. Let us assume that we are given a sequence of server
rates rj such that r1 > η. We wish to show that there exists
a sequence {cj , j ∈ S}, such that cj/rj is strictly increasing
and that the following two inequalities are satisfied
c1 + c2 < (r1 + r2 − η)c2/r2, (55)X
j∈S
√
cjrj > (
X
j∈S
rj − η)
p
cC/rC , (56)
which would imply that only the first server is used in the
solution of the individual optimization problem whereas all
the servers are used in the global solution.
From (55), we require
c2
r2
>
c1
r1
r1
r1 − η .
For 2 ≤ j ≤ C, let
cj
rj
=
c1
r1
r1
r1 − η α
2j ,
which results in an increasing sequence {cj/rj , j ∈ S} pro-
vided that α > 1. We shall show that there exists an α > 1
such that the two inequalities (55) and (56) are satisfied.
The left-hand side of (56)
X
j∈S
√
cjrj =
X
j∈S
r
cj
rj
rj
=
r
c1
r1
r1 +
X
j≥2
r
c1
r1
r
r1
r1 − η α
2rj
>
r
c1
r1
r1 +
r
c1
r1
r
r1
r1 − η
0
@X
j≥2
rj
1
A .
Thus, we need to find an α larger than 1 which satisfies the
inequality
r
c1
r1
r1 +
r
c1
r1
r
r1
r1 − η
0
@X
j≥2
rj
1
A > (r − η)
p
cC/rC
= (r − η)
r
c1
r1
r
r1
r1 − η α
C .
The left-hand side of the above inequality,
r
c1
r1
r1 +
r
c1
r1
r
r1
r1 − η
0
@X
j≥2
rj
1
A
=
r
c1
r1
r
r1
r1 − η
0
@pr1(r1 − η) +
X
j≥2
rj
1
A
>
r
c1
r1
r
r1
r1 − η (r − η)
where the inequality follows from the fact that
p
r1(r1 − η) >p
(r − η)(r1 − η) = r1 − η. Thus, there exists an α larger
than 1 for which SI = {1} and SI ⊂ SG. As r1 ↓ η, PoA
will become unbounded in this case as well.
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